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INTRODUCTION 
 
Any radical political change produces a dramatic reformulation of national history and public memory 
among both elites and publics and at a variety of scales. The post-socialist states of East-Central 
Europe (ECE) represent one of the best contemporary examples. In the two decades since 
overthrowing authoritarian socialist regimes, the countries of this region have struggled with their 
recent past. Debates around history and memory in the post-socialist period have predominantly 
focused on World War II, the Holocaust and various inter-War periods of independence. However, at 
the heart of this issue, and the focus of this chapter, is the tension between remembering and 
forgetting the socialist era. At the ‘official’ level – the arena of national politics - there is generally 
little interest in remembering socialism. In some countries there is the possibility of officially 
recognizing anti-Communist resistance (such as Solidarity in Poland) or the victims of Communism, 
and in some cases there is recognition of the importance of some Communist figures for the nation 
(for example, the reburial of Imry Nagy in Hungary in 1989). However, the dominant imperative to 
demonstrate allegiance to global political and economic orthodoxies (and make a claim for 
membership of transnational organisations such as NATO or the EU) requires an emphatic 
repudiation of socialist rule. However, at a more local scale, individual memories of the socialist era 
cannot be simply erased or denied. Instead, within their everyday lives many people may remember 
socialism in a more ambivalent and nuanced manner. Such local memories can constitute a form of 
‘counter-memory’1: practices of remembrance that are out of alignment with the efforts of the state to 
shape and define the remembrance of the socialist era. Such local counter-memories of socialism are 
discordant with the ‘official’ imperatives to repudiate socialism.  
 
In this chapter we examine such local memories of socialism in post-socialist Romania. To establish a 
context for the later discussion we start by considering the nature of official and popular memory 
under state socialism. We then consider the fluid and dynamic nature of memory in post-socialist 
societies focusing on two, seemingly contradictory trends: the ‘official’ rejection of the socialist era, 
and popular nostalgia for, and remembrance of, that same past. We go on to explore this tension 
between remembering and forgetting with reference to locally-grounded memories of major socialist-
era Romanian politicians. Such figures are condemned at the level of official discourse for their 
involvement in the socialist regime, but such disapprobation is contested at the local level where they 
are remembered in far more approving terms.  
 
 
 
ANTECEDENTS: OFFICIAL AND LOCAL MEMORY UNDER SOCIALISM  
 
To understand the nature of local memory and counter-memory under post-socialism it is necessary to 
consider the historical context of memory formation in state socialist regimes. Communist Party 
regimes came to power throughout East-Central Europe after the Second World War intent on a 
radical transformation of society and the creation of a ‘new world’.2 The founding principle of 
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socialist regimes was a decisive break with the past, so that almost everything inherited from the pre-
socialist order needed to be dismantled. Political pluralism was abolished to be replaced by 
uncontested rule by the Communist Party. Capitalist economies were replaced by nationalized 
ownership of the means of production, followed in turn by centralised economic planning intended to 
eliminate the social and spatial inequalities created by capitalism. The social structures of the former 
regime – education, religion, the judicial system – were all remade in accordance with the agenda of 
state socialism.  
 
In this context socialist Party-states also sought to transform senses of individual and collective 
identities in order to create a “new socialist man”.3 Initially this involved attempting to eliminate 
senses of national identity – since the nation was conceived as a specifically bourgeois concept - and 
replace them with a new sense of class solidarity and socialist internationalism. In order to remake 
identities it was necessary to remake the past in order to reshape collective memory (particularly since 
memories of the pre-socialist era were an implicit threat to the new regime
4
). Thus Communist Party 
regimes swiftly set about rewriting history to legitimate their rule. The Party-state was in a position to 
do this since it enjoyed a monopoly over the production of history
5
 through its appointment of 
academic historians and control of the educational system. Revising the past took a number of 
familiar, Orwellian forms. Formerly central events and personalities (such as monarchs or liberal 
politicians) were erased from the historical narrative, while the statues that had commemorated them 
were removed and the streets that honoured them were renamed. At the same time, new figures who 
exemplified class struggle were elevated to hero status, while the events in which they had 
participated were celebrated and commemorated. In some cases, historical revisionism was intended 
to eliminate historical senses of identification with Western Europe, since the West was now the 
ideological enemy. For example, in Romania, the socialist rewriting of history involved downplaying 
cultural ties with Western Europe (particularly France), whilst asserting (or inventing) long-standing 
historical ties with Russia.
6
 
 
However, while socialist regimes sought to falsify and obliterate memory
7
 in their efforts to transform 
historical consciousness they were only partially successful. Communist party-states were much less 
powerful than is often supposed
8
 and did not enjoy absolute. Thus, the attempts by Party-states to 
shape individual memories were refracted through a range of other experiences including personal, 
family and community memories.
9
 Thus socialist regimes were unable to prevent the circulation of 
alternative and local visions of the past, present and future
10
 that diverged from the ‘official’ line. 
They included memories of events and personalities from the pre-socialist period that remained alive 
within popular memory. Similarly, despite attempts to discourage religious observance, memories of 
religious practices and traditions persisted stubbornly at the local level. Efforts to create collective 
farms failed to erase local memories of private property boundaries.
11
 Indeed, sometimes such local, 
counter-memories were circulated as a deliberate act of resistance to state power.  
 
                                                     
3
 Ibid, p. 122. 
4
 G.Kligman and K. Verdery, Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962 
(Princeton: Princetown University Press, 2011),p. 17. 
5
 M.Ciobanu, ‘Rewriting and remembering Romanian communism: some controversial issues’, Nationalities 
Papers, 39/2 (2011), 205-221. 
6
 L.Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), 
pp.70-73. 
7
 V. Tismaneanu ‘Coming to terms with a traumatic past: Reflections on democracy, atonement, and memory’, 
in History of Communism in Europe, Vol 1: Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Europe (Bucharest: Zeta 
Books, 2010), p.17. 
8
 K.Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp 83-87.  
9
 Kligman and Verdery Peasants, p 13. 
10
 S.Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, Basic Books, 2001), pp 61-62. 
11
 K. Verdery, What was Socialism and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.157. 
In addition, socialist regimes were not entirely successful in their attempt to eradicate national 
identities. Indeed, as Verdery argues
12
, the national idea was so effectively inculcated in ECE that 
Community Party regimes were unable to expunge national sentiments. Thus, some socialist states 
came to accept national ideology and sometimes used it within powerful programmes intended to 
shape memory and national identity.
13
 For example, the Communist authorities in post-War Poland 
made considerable efforts to establish a sense of Polishness which involved a rewriting of history 
combined with the expulsion of other national and ethnic populations, cultures and memories within 
the newly established state boundaries.
14
  
 
 
 
MEMORY IN POST-SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 
 
The socialist states of ECE collapsed between 1989 and 1991 while the Soviet Union was dissolved at 
the end of 1991. All these countries (to varying degrees) renounced single-party rule and centralized 
economic planning, and committed themselves to radical political and economic reform. As they 
exited from socialist rule, post-socialist societies faced a dilemma similar to that experienced by other 
countries at the end of a period of authoritarian rule: how is society to come to terms with a 
problematic and traumatic past founded on values that are now rejected, and which represents the very 
antithesis of the country’s future aspirations. In post-socialist societies the recent past has become 
highly politicized and a range of actors (both elites and publics
15
) have participated (and often 
competed) in efforts to shape the ways in which society approaches and negotiates its relationship 
with the socialist era. All shifts in political power generate “a reconfiguration of the “known past””16 
and in this context memory in post-socialist societies is fluid, dynamic, fractured and contested. 
Hence, it is hardly surprising that dealing with the socialist past has consumed considerable time and 
energy in post-socialist societies.
17
 Moreover, different countries have approached their socialist past 
in different ways. Some (such as the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia) have ‘dealt’ swiftly 
and decisively with their socialist past, while others (such as Romania, Bulgaria, the former 
Yugoslavia and Albania) have found the process more problematic.
18
 Nevertheless, throughout the 
formerly socialist states of ECE two broad trends can be identified: an emphatic rejection of the 
socialist past, and a more nebulous popular nostalgia for the recent past.  
 
 
The Rejection of the Socialist Past 
 
Throughout ECE and the Soviet Union the exit from socialism was marked by an immediate and 
public rejection of socialism. Socialist regimes had enjoyed little popular support or legitimacy in 
their final years among a populace eager for change. Consequently, beyond socialist diehards or those 
whose livelihood depended on the socialist system there were few voices calling for a retention of 
Communist Party rule. The opposition groups that, in many countries, had played a key role in 
bringing about the downfall of socialist regimes had based their platform on dismantling the political 
and economic structures of state socialism. The new model was the ‘West’ and most ECE countries 
regarded a rejection of socialism and a ‘return to Europe’ as different sides of the same coin. Having 
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long been ‘Other’ in political terms, post-socialist countries now sought to convince the West that 
they had definitively renounced socialism. Instead, post-socialist governments sought to establish new 
political identities as liberal ‘European’ states with which the West could do business. This entailed 
demonstrating their commitment to the transnational orthodoxies of multi-party democracy and 
neoliberal capitalism.   
 
Within this political project, there was no place for the socialist past. Indeed, socialism represented 
the very antithesis of the political and economic values to which the East-Central European states 
aspired. In this context, socialism was treated as a huge aberration that was best forgotten: there was 
little to be learned from the socialist era and little to be gained from remembering it. Thus, in most 
post-socialist states, the socialist era was virtually erased from official memory, a strategy which 
Tismaneanu terms the “politics of forgetfulness”19. Such a situation is not, of itself, unique to the post-
socialist world since it is well established that forgetting is as central to the formation of collective 
memory and national identities as remembrance and commemoration.
20
 It does, however, illustrate a 
distinctly post-socialist understanding of history in which a substantial part of the recent past can be 
simply erased from the national time line. Verdery
21
 argues that this practice “reveals an interesting 
conception of time, in which time is not fixed and irreversible. One can pick up the time line, snip and 
discard the communist piece of it that one no longer wishes to acknowledge, paste the severed ends 
together and hey presto! One has a new historical time line. One has not accepted and incorporated 
the recent past, one has simply excised it” In effect, post-socialism was about ‘returning’ to the 
historical trajectory of the pre-Second World War period, which had been disrupted by the 
Communist Party takeover. The four decades of socialism were – initially at least - treated as if they 
had not happened. Instead narratives of the past frequently focused on a variety of pre-socialist eras, 
especially those that could be reclaimed as a ‘Golden Age’ of the nation.22 
 
This eradication of socialism from collective memory manifested itself in many ways.
23
 It involved 
the familiar and iconic processes of “landscape cleansing”24 in which the public symbols of the 
socialist era were erased from public space. Thus, statues were torn down, streets renamed, and 
monumental socialist buildings given new uses appropriate to a post-socialist state.
25
 Museums closed 
their galleries which dealt with the recent past. Similarly, the socialist era disappeared from the school 
history curriculum. Other practices seek to reverse the events of the socialist period in an attempt to 
restore the situation the existed before socialism. Thus, property restitution seeks to restore property 
nationalized by the state to its former owners. Similarly, agricultural land that was forcibly absorbed 
into collective farms was returned to the original owners or their descendants. 
 
This strategy of attempting to extirpate the socialist era from collective memory was not confined to 
political elites. Instead, it enjoyed widespread tacit support among much of the wider populace. Those 
who had harsh experiences of repression and suffering under totalitarian rule were reluctant to relive 
them. Others had dismal memories of austerity, shortages and harassment which they had little desire 
to remember. In addition, there were many who had an uneasy conscience and were unwilling to 
reflect on their own record of participation and complicity with the former regime.
26
 This was 
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particularly the case in countries which had had an extensive internal security service (such as East 
Germany or Romania) where significant numbers of people were ‘informants’ of some kind. Rather 
than deal openly with such issues, most post-communist societies preferred to bury them: it was far 
easier to leave skeletons in the closet rather than disinter them and potentially face the resulting 
recrimination. While there have been many critics of this strategy it is entirely understandable as a 
personal response to dealing with a traumatic and unhappy past.  
 
Over time, post-socialist societies developed a more ambivalent approach to their recent past. Efforts 
(among both elites and the wider public) to forget the socialist era had been challenged by many civil 
society groups and NGOS. Such bodies actively challenged the collective desire to forget by 
promoting remembrance of the socialist era, and particularly its atrocities and victims. In many cases, 
NGOS were active in the construction of memorials to the victims of totalitarian rule and often sought 
EU support for their activities.
27
 Such activities represented a form of counter-memory (and counter-
memorialisation) that challenged the dominant collective amnesia about the socialist past. Political 
pluralism and personal freedom has opened up space for a variety of evaluations of the socialist past 
to co-exist, especially in societies where decades of Communist rule have left a legacy of distrust of 
official narratives about the past. The marketization of the economy and the mediatisation of society 
has opened up new avenues for constructing memories of the socialist era, from television 
documentaries and webpages, new publishing houses producing a variety of memoirs and histories, 
and private tourism companies seeking to exploit interest in the socialist past.  
 
Moreover, as the time interval between the present and the socialist era has increased, attitudes to that 
past started to change among both political elites and the wider public. While socialism was still 
repudiated in most countries, there was an increasing acknowledgment (although sometimes tentative) 
of the socialist era and its place in collective memory. There was increasing commemoration of the 
victims of the socialist era through the establishment of monuments, memorials and museums with a 
wide variety of sponsors.
28
 Gradually museum displays started to address the socialist era, while 
school history text books introduced a discussion of the socialist era (that had hitherto been entirely 
absent). Socialist-era archives were opened to researchers, including in some countries the records of 
surveillance undertaken by internal security services. In some cases there were formal reports or 
investigations into the socialist era (the best example being Romania’s ‘Presidential Commission for 
the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania’).29 
 
 
Nostalgia for the Socialist Past 
 
The second defining characteristic of post-socialist memory is a paradoxical inversion of the desire to 
forget: nostalgia for the socialist era. Nostalgia can be defined as a “sentiment of loss and 
displacement”.30 In this case, it takes the form of a wistful and sentimental remembrance (and 
sometimes a yearning for) the socialist era. In extreme forms it can involve an idealisation of the past 
and, in some cases, a desire to return to authoritarian Communist Party rule. More commonly it takes 
the form of a belief that not everything was bad under socialism
31
and a longing for some of the 
certainties of the socialist era. Such nostalgia is an individual sentiment but is so widespread that it 
can be identified as a distinctive collective mood. The emergence of such post-socialist nostalgia was 
so unexpected that it shocked and surprised many in both Western Europe and the ECE countries 
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themselves.
32
 Given the elation at the overthrow of socialist regimes few expected that, within a few 
years, many would be remembering that era with fondness. 
 
The extent of post-socialist nostalgia is impossible to dismiss. As early as 1993 Eurobarometer 
surveys were indicating that significant minorities in all post-socialist countries (ranging from just 
over 5% in the Czech Republic to more than 25% in Bulgaria) approved of a return towards 
Communist Party rule.
33
 Over time, the number of people reporting such sentiments has steadily 
increased and numerous studies have reported large minorities – and sometimes a majority – who feel 
that their lives were better under communism and that they would welcome a return to communist 
rule. Such nostalgia seems to be most pronounced among older people who lived and worked during 
the period of Communist Party rule and this group are also more likely to be sceptical towards 
democratic government.
34
 However, surprisingly, young people (who may sometimes have few direct 
memories of socialism) are also undogmatically appreciative of the former regime.
35
 The fact that 
nostalgia for socialism is so widespread among such a broad segment of society illustrates how the 
socialist era has become a firmly established part of collective memories in ECE, despite efforts to 
erase the socialist past from official memory.  
 
Nostalgia for the socialist era takes many forms but is most apparent in popular culture. Since 
nostalgia is easily commodified
36
 numerous products have appeared that cater for the apparently 
enthusiastic remembrance of socialism. For example, recent films evoke the everyday conditions of 
life under socialist rule. Perhaps the best known is ‘Good Bye Lenin’ which tapped into a popular 
vein of what has been termed ‘ostalgia’ in the former East Germany. Similarly, in Romania ‘Tales 
from the Golden Age’ a collection of short films that played with various communist-era urban myths 
enjoyed considerable success. In 1998 the state television channel in the Czech Republic, rebroadcast 
30 Cases of Major Zemen a television series from the 1970s about the work and home life of an 
ordinary police office. This was greeted by almost universal approval by Czechs of all ages.
37
 In 
Romania, a socialist-era brand of chocolate bar – ‘Rom’ – has been rebranded and relaunched and is 
reported to be now the most popular chocolate in the country. In Hungary a CD of patriotic socialist 
songs was a surprise hit in 1998, reaching number one in Hungary’s music chart.38 And in Romania a 
businessman even opened a ‘Museum of the Socialist Republic of Romania’ offering an overtly 
nostalgic experience of Ceauşescu’s Romania.39 In many other ways throughout ECE socialism ‘sells’ 
and products that overtly recall the socialist era find a ready market.  
 
How, then, is this nostalgic remembrance of the socialist era to be explained? The answer lies in the 
profound upheaval that accompanied the dismantling of the socialist economy. The economic model 
adopted by almost all post-socialist states was that of Western neoliberal capitalism and while 
individual countries differed in the pace at which they sought to arrive at this goal the end point was 
the same. But while the populations of the socialist countries had been enthusiastic about political 
change they had often not anticipated the economic shock that post-socialism necessarily involved. 
Restructuring and privatisation of formerly state-owned industries resulted in huge job losses and 
rising unemployment, ending the socialist-era practice of a guaranteed job with a reasonable wage. 
The liberalisation of formerly state-controlled prices generated rapid inflation, and since wages rarely 
kept pace with rising prices most people experienced a decline in their living standards. The 
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liberalisation of international trade meant a rapid inflow of imported Western goods and full exposure 
to cultural globalisation and Western consumer culture.
40
 Moreover, the elaborate social care system 
developed by socialist states was dismantled so that free health care and social security could no 
longer be guaranteed.  
 
Along with the deteriorating material conditions of post-socialism, many people experienced a 
profound challenge to senses of personal identity. Post-socialist restructuring produced a severe 
‘cultural shock’41 among large sectors of the population. A system that had seemed permanent and 
invincible had disappeared almost overnight. This sense of upheaval was superbly captured in the 
phrase “Everything was forever, until it was no more”.42 Many people were profoundly unsettled to 
find that the system that had formed the entire context for their lives - within which they had lived and 
worked, and which had given their lives dignity and meaning
43
 - was now written off as a historical 
mistake. Some groups – such as the ‘engineer class’ created and exalted by socialism44  – found that 
their professional skills and training were now redundant in the new era of neoliberal capitalism. 
Many people who would never have described themselves as communists had taken pride in their 
work, and many more recognized that they were working within a system that sought to build a better 
and more equal world. They now discovered that everything they had worked for counted for nothing.  
 
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that many look back nostalgically to the socialist era. As 
Todorova
45
 argues, this nostalgia comprises both a longing for something (order, stability, security, 
prosperity and a specific form of sociability and ‘togetherness’) and also a sense of loss for the 
certainties of socialism (jobs, houses, health care). However, such nostalgia is not a delusional form of 
escapism, neither is it a malady (as some critics have suggested).
46
 Instead, it is an individual and 
collective strategy for coming to terms with change. At times of shock or upheaval, it is a normal 
human reaction to search for solace and security, and this can frequently be found in the past. In this 
sense remembrance – and the activation of memory – is a purposeful strategy for coming to terms 
with change. Indeed, Boym identifies post-socialist nostalgia as a form of “defense mechanism”.47 
Those who are nostalgic for socialism may miss those times but are not usually seeking to return to 
them.
48
 Instead, they are using memory as a way of dealing with the present. Moreover, this positive 
(and selective) way of thinking about the socialist era is transmitted from parents to children who, in 
turn, become curious about socialism and are not necessarily inclined to reject it out of hand.  
 
In the context of state-sponsored projects to forget (or deny the legitimacy of) the socialist past, post-
socialist nostalgia represents a significant form of counter-memory that keeps the memory of the 
socialist era alive. Counter-memory can be defined as a “refusal to remember in a conformist 
fashion”.49 It embraces social rather than political history and ordinary rather than elite memories.50 It 
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can also be explicitly associated with a refusal to forget.
51
 Nostalgia for socialism – which remembers 
the socialist era in positive terms, through the lens of the experiences of ordinary people – therefore 
directly confronts ‘official’ efforts to forget or reject the socialist past. Indeed, nostalgia for the 
socialist past can be a deliberate act of defiance: “a resistance strategy of preserving one’s personal 
history and group’s identity against the new ideological narratives, historical revisionism and imposed 
amnesia”.52 As a form of counter-memory post-socialist nostalgia therefore problematizes the whole 
process of forgetting the socialist era. It also opens up the possibility of local memories of socialism 
that are discordant with state projects to reject the socialist era as a historical aberration. In the 
following section we explore such local, counter-memories in post-socialist Romania.  
 
 
 
LOCAL MEMORIES OF SOCIALISM IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA 
 
The National Context 
 
Romania exemplifies both trends discussed above: the repudiation of the socialist past and also 
nostalgia for that past. Under Nicolae Ceauşescu’s autocratic rule during the 1980s Romanians had 
experienced extreme austerity (with almost all the population experiencing severe rationing of food 
and power) along with intrusive harassment and surveillance by the internal security services. 
Ceauşescu was overthrown and executed in the ‘revolution’ of December 1989 and the Romanian 
population was united in hoping for a better future. There was an almost unanimous condemnation of 
socialism among both the political elite and the wider public. Many of the leaders of the 1989 
‘revolution’ were former members of the Romanian Communist Party with deep roots in the former 
regime. Thus they were eager to bury communism and avoid any questioning of their own pasts.
53
 It 
was perhaps for this reason that Romania was the only post-socialist state to formally ban the 
Communist Party. In addition, many Romanians were reluctant to confront their own complicity and 
co-operation with the former regime and preferred instead to forget.
54
 There followed a long period of 
amnesia in which the socialist past was erased from collective and individual memory:  indeed, 
Romania was the exemplar of the authorized amnesia outlined above.  
 
The ‘official’ repudiation of socialism culminated in the report commissioned by President Băsescu in 
April 2006 into the illegality and crimes committed by the socialist regime. This investigation was 
undertaken by a team of historians led by Vladimir Tismaneanu. The final report
55
 unequivocally 
condemned the socialist regime that had ruled between 1947-89. It was formally was accepted by the 
president who issued a public condemnation of the socialist era in a speech to the Romanian 
parliament in December 2006 (shortly before Romania’s accession to the EU). However, the report 
was largely disregarded by the Romanian legislature.
56
 
 
At the same time, nostalgia for the socialist era is pervasive among middle-aged and older Romanians. 
Various rounds of economic restructuring during the 1990s produced economic recession and a sharp 
decline in living standards. Neoliberal restructuring after 1996 increased the rate of closure of 
socialist-era industries and subsequent job losses. In addition, Romanians have looked on appalled as 
the socialist-era nomenclature have enriched themselves at the expense of the state. Unsurprisingly, 
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there are many who feel that their lives were better during the socialist era, and opinion polls 
consistently confirm this. For example, in 1993, 13% of the population reportedly approved of a 
return to communist rule.
57
 By 1998, 51% of the population stated that life before 1989 was “better 
than now”.58 By 2003 two-thirds of the population claimed to be nostalgic for communism.59 Indeed, 
many older people directly praise Nicolae Ceauşescu and speak of wanting to return to the order and 
certainty of the 1980s.  
 
 
Local Memories of Socialism  
 
Within this national context Romania, in common with other post-socialist states, exhibits a multitude 
of local memory formations which challenge official repudiation of the socialist past. Understanding 
memory in the post-socialist context also requires consideration of memory formation in different 
local and regional contexts, as memory is shaped by different histories and post-socialist trajectories, 
and rural and more peripheral contexts require consideration as much as the shaping of memory in the 
capital. In this section we explore a number of these local memories (in both rural and urban 
locations) in relation to key Romanian Communist leaders and politicians.  
 
The first examples consider the local memories in remote rural areas of two significant former 
Romanian socialist politicians - Dr. Petru Groza and Emil Bodnăraș. Groza (1884-1958) was born in 
the small Transylvanian village of Bǎcia. He led the first, communist-dominated government after 
World War II, was Prime Minister (1945-52) and later titular Head of State (1952-58). After the War 
he played a key role in securing the return of northern Transylvania (which in 1940 had been annexed 
by Hungary) to Romania, an event which was organized by the Soviets to win him popular support. In 
the late 1940s he was instrumental in overseeing the Communist Party takeover of power and 
remaking post-War Romania as a socialist state following the model of the Soviet Union. He was also 
involved in enforcing the abdication of the King in 1947. His historical role in Romania’s 
development is thus a complex one: although he was the prime minister of a socialist state he also 
remained a lay member of the Romanian Orthodox Church. After his death in 1958 he was buried in a 
Bucharest cemetery until 1965 when his body was moved to a monumental mausoleum constructed in 
a Bucharest park. In early 1990 his family moved his body from the mausoleum to his home village 
where he was reburied in the local churchyard.  
 
Emil Bodnăraș was born in the small settlement of Iaslovăţ in the far north of Romania to a German 
mother and a Ukranian father. He had close links with the Soviet security services and worked as a 
Soviet spy in Romania.  He was in charge of the internal security services during late 1940s when, 
with Soviet support, the Romanian Communist Party progressively took over the entire apparatus of 
state power.  A committed communist and an army general he was Minister for Defence (1947-1955) 
and subsequently Minister for Transport and also held a number of other senior positions in the state 
apparatus. He is also credited with influencing Nikita Krushchev to withdraw Soviet troops from 
Romania in 1958.He showed total loyalty to Nicolae Ceauşescu when the latter rose to power in 1965.    
At his request he was buried not in Bucharest but in the village of his birth. 
 
Both Dr Petru Groza and Emil Bodnaraş were closely associated with the Communist takeover of 
power and the transformation of the country into a totalitarian socialist state. Both were senior 
politicians in a state that ruled through repression and terror in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
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Unsurprisingly both are condemned in the 2006 Presidential Commission.
60
 Groza is described as an 
opportunist ‘fellow traveller’ who was exploited by the Romanian Communist Party to give a 
pretence of legitimate and representative government. Bodnaraş is portrayed as a shadowy power 
broker who was thoroughly implicated in the Communist Party’s internecine internal conflicts. At the 
level of the Romanian state seeking to re-integrate itself into a regional European and global context 
they are repudiated figures from a rejected past. However, even at a national scale this state-led 
shaping of memory is differentiated, with, for example, several biographies and historical studies of 
Groza emphasizing other aspects of his achievements, such as his active involvement in the Romanian 
Orthodox Church. Both are recognized for their achievements (such as Groza’s role in regaining 
northern Transylvania after the Second World War, and Bodnaraş’s apparent involvement in securing 
the withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania). 
 
However, it is when local memory formation around Groza and Bodnăraș is considered that the way 
that memory is formed in tension between the local, the national and the global is most explicit
61
. 
Despite condemnation by the post-socialist Romanian state, local memories of the two Communists 
are almost overwhelmingly positive. For example, the mayor of Băcia described Groza to be ‘foarte 
apreciat’ (‘very much appreciated’) by the majority of the local population in his home village. 
Similarly, Bodnăraș is admired for his patriotism: ‘He was a patriot, he fought for the country, he was 
an officer. A good man.’ Of course, it is a feature of these positive counter-memories that they are 
highly selective and involve as much forgetting as remembering. In neither case was mention made of 
any of the negative aspects of their actions or roles in Romania’s development as a socialist state. In 
fact, the construction of their memories involves the exclusion of less favourable issues. In Groza’s 
case people are keen to stress that he was not a Communist at all (despite being prime minister he was 
never a member of the Romanian Communist Party) while for Bodnăraș people emphasize that stories 
about his having been a Soviet spy and a murderer are wrong. Instead, both are held in high regard, as 
local ‘men made good’ who did much for the nation and for their places of birth. Their role in national 
affairs and their activities for the benefit of the nation (such as regaining Transylvania or ‘resisting’ 
Soviet control) are a particularly strong part of these positive counter-memories. In addition these 
local communities express a strong sense of ownership of both figures -  they were ‘ours’ but went 
they went on to lead the nation. As one man in Bǎcia stated:  ‘he [Groza] left here and he led the 
country very well.’ Both politicians are credited with having helped the church at a national and local 
level. Moreover, both are remembered for what they did to benefit their home villages while in power. 
As one woman commented about Bodnăraș “He was a good man. He did lots of things for the village 
– a school, church.” In fact, such narratives often suggest that they would have done more in both 
cases but they were constrained by the Communist apparatus of which they were a part.  
 
This de-linking of their characters and achievements from the Communist regime is a key aspect of 
the selective remembering which takes place. As a very elderly man in Iaslovăţ repeated several times 
“Bodnăraș was not such a passionate  communist”. In the case of Groza the emphasis is on his role as 
a national leader who was capable and developed the nation. As respondents in Bǎcia remembered 
‘He spoke personally to Stalin and convinced him to cede northern Transylvania to Romania’ and ‘He 
was the only man who opposed the Soviets.’ In both cases these attributes are contrasted with present-
day Romanian politicians. Thus these local memories are produced and reproduced in relation to the 
national in complex ways – simultaneously linking to notions of national pride but denying that 
accolade to post-socialist political parties and politicians, and reclaiming and maintaining positive 
memories of these local figures in a way running counter to state-led evaluations of their role during 
the socialist era. Indeed, in the case of Groza his memory is a source of contemporary pride which is 
used to distinguish the commune of Bǎcia and to build a sense of local identity. One respondent stated 
that ‘He’s a symbol of the commune’ and the village’s Mayor made the point that when people ask 
what Bǎcia is known for he is keen to stress the fact that it is the birthplace of Petru Groza. 
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62
 Certainly the statues of Groza in 
Bucharest and Deva were taken down and removed from public view (the Deva statue was abandoned 
at the back of the county hall in Deva). However, the bust of Groza in Băcia was not removed, 
although it suffered some minor vandalism. Unexpectedly the Deva statue was recently moved to 
Băcia at the request of the commune authorities who wish to re-erect it as a small tourist attraction 
intended to commemorate Groza’s connections with his home village.63 Far from being despised 
symbols of the former regime, the statue and bust of Groza in Băcia are now material sites of counter-
memory, symbolizing the importance of local memories in shaping local identity in a way that runs 
counter to the efforts of the post-socialist state.  
 
The situation in Iaslovăţ is even more unexpected. A bronze bust of Bodnaraş was erected in his home 
village after the politician’s death and placed in front of the cultural centre (for which Bodnaraş had 
arranged funding in the early 1970s). The bust was removed in early 1990s by local people during the 
period of elation that followed the overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu. However, local stories say little 
about it being removed as an unwanted communist symbol or as evidence of contempt for Bodnaraş.  
In 2003, on the initiative of the village authorities, a copy of the statue was produced and erected on 
the original pedestal where it still stands (see Figure 1).
64
 Again, it confounds the popular stereotype 
that the collapse of socialist regimes was accompanied by a purging of socialist symbols from the 
public landscape. The re-installation of the bust of Emil Bodnaraş testifies to sincerely-held local 
appreciation of him and it represents a significant manifestation of local memory that runs counter to 
the ‘official’ imperative to shape post-socialist memory by ‘forgetting’ socialism.  
 
Figure 1 somewhere after here 
 
Caption: Figure 1:  Bust of Emil Bodnaraş in Iaslovaţ, erected in the post-socialist period 
 
 
However, local memories of socialism are not confined to remote and rural parts of the country. 
Instead, counter-memories of socialism can also be found in the heart of Romania’s capital, 
Bucharest. Again, we can illustrate this through the graves of socialist politicians, particularly the two 
General Secretaries of the Romanain Communist Party: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1947-65) and 
Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-89). Nicolae Ceauşescu was buried (initially under a false name) in 
Ghencea Cemetery in western Bucharest although the location and identity of the grave seem to have 
been well known. In the upheaval of the post-socialist period Ceauşescu’s grave quickly became the 
focus for those nostalgic for the era of his rule. It is now a significant site of counter-memory in 
Bucharest. As early as 1992 the grave was being carefully maintained.
65
 A fence was erected around it 
and the original wooden cross replaced by a stone one (which features a red star). The grave is 
invariably covered with fresh flowers, candles and ribbons (see Figure 2), and it is not unusual to see 
individuals or groups assembled by it. During a visit to the grave one of the authors was told by a 
passing Romanian that “He [Ceauşescu] deserves something much bigger and nicer”. It is the focal 
point for spontaneous and unorganized acts of remembrance by individuals who regret the passing of 
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Ceauşescu. It is also the site for more formal acts of commemoration on the anniversaries of 
Ceauşescu’s birth and death. These are often organized by the successor to the Romanian Communist 
Party and are attended by small crowds (not all of whom are elderly). 
 
Figure 2 somewhere after here 
Caption:  Figure 2:  Nicolae Ceauşescu’s grave in Bucharest 
 
 
More surprisingly, the grave of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej has also become a site of counter-memory, 
although to a lesser extent than that of Ceauşescu. Gheorghiu-Dej was a cynical and ruthless political 
operator who oversaw a period of state terror during the late 1940s and 1950s. On his death he was 
buried in the same mausoleum as Petru Groza and in the early 1990s his body was removed and 
reburied in a Bucharest. There are few with any reason to have fond memories of Gheorghiu-Dej’s 
period of rule and yet even his grave has become a quiet site of counter-memory. Small groups of 
flowers can sometimes be seen on the grave and it is also the site for formal remembrance ceremonies 
(some of which are posted to Youtube). Both examples illustrate how local memories of socialism 
which contest the state-sponsored condemnation of Romania’s socialist regime persist (and seemingly 
flourish) in the centre of the capital. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Tismaneanu talks about the “still unmastered past”66 of socialism in East-Central Europe and in many 
ways the socialist era still haunts the present in this region. At the centre of this dilemma is the tension 
between remembering and forgetting. Post-socialist regimes have generally been eager to draw a line 
under state socialism and treat the socialist era as a historical aberration that is best forgotten. 
Moreover, the political imperative to demonstrate allegiance to multinational norms of political and 
economic development, along with national aspirations of a ‘return to Europe’, has demanded a 
repudiation of socialism in order to demonstrate adherence to ‘Western’ values. However, at the level 
of the individual, attitudes towards the socialist era are more ambivalent. For those who lived through 
the socialist era senses of personal identity are founded on, and grounded within, memories of that 
era. Socialism was the context within which people lived and worked, and which structured everyday 
lives. Many people are, therefore, reluctant to write off an entire period of their personal biographies. 
Add to this the sense of upheaval and disorder that has characterized the ‘transition’ to democracy and 
a market economy and it is unsurprising that many people feel nostalgic for the certainties of the 
socialist era. Looking back in this way is a strategy for dealing with the present.   
 
This context creates circumstances where popular and local memories (or counter-memories) of 
socialism can collide with state-sponsored projects to repudiate the socialist era. In this chapter we 
have examined some examples of such local/counter memories in post-socialist Romania. The cases 
of Petru Groza and Emil Bodnaraş illustrate how socialist politicians who are condemned in official 
discourse can be held in high esteem in local contexts. Their role within the repressive apparatus of 
the socialist state (which is highlighted in official censure of their activities) is not denied, but other 
aspects of their lives and deeds are highlighted in more positive terms. In particular, both figures are 
venerated for their contribution to their home villages: it was their local activities and projects that 
had the greatest impact on the lives of people in those villages and it is these activities for which they 
are predominantly remembered. Lest such local counter-memories should be regarded as unique to 
isolated and peripheral parts of the country, the graves of Nicolae Ceauşescu and Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej also illustrate how popular counter-memories of socialism can flourish in the capital 
city. These examples illustrate the fluid, contextual and contested nature of memory in a post-socialist 
context. Of course, the experience in Romania cannot be generalized to every country of post-socialist 
East-Central Europe. The tension between remembering and forgetting is worked out in different 
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ways in each post-socialist country and will be influenced by circumstances such as the nature of the 
experience of socialism, the strength of civil society in the post-socialist era, and the will of the 
political elite to draw a line under state socialism.   
 
Finally, a key point to emerge from this analysis is the need to consider the formation of memories of 
the socialist period which are more complex than outright condemnation or nostalgia. These two 
extremes have been the focus of most studies focusing on post-socialist memories to date. However, 
the case studies in this chapter have revealed the need for analyses which explore a more nuanced 
understanding of post-socialist memory that incorporates those two perspectives but also opens up the 
multiplicity of memories of the experience of socialism. Such memories might be condemnatory; 
nostalgic; about the everyday and the mundane (shortages, queuing, schooldays and holiday-making); 
about pride in achievement (both personal and national); and pride in the socialist nation and its 
national leaders. What the case studies in this chapter have shown is that the majority of memories are 
not clear-cut. The post-socialist Romanian state may have developed a strategy firmly based on the 
repudiation of the socialist past, but for the vast majority of Romanians their memories of the socialist 
era are much more nuanced and complex. Elites and publics are not monolithic entities and they have 
a vast range of personal and group experiences of socialism to draw on and a considerable diversity of 
social and political goals in the post-socialist context. Memories are formed at overlapping scales 
which bring the local, the national and the global into contact in complex ways. If contemporary 
memory is characterized by its democratisation (with the ability to form and promote different 
memories increasingly open to all) then in the post-socialist context it is vital to explore the 
perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens in those countries where political elites have repudiated the 
memory of socialism. Future studies of post-socialist memory formation need to let their voices and 
memories speak. 
 
